



• Restrictions to control Covid-19 spread have put 
immense pressure on international trade and 
investment.  Global trade is predicted to fall by 
13 – 32%, while foreign direct investment (FDI) 
may sink even deeper with estimates ranging 
between 30% and 40%.
• Global value chains (GVC) are reorganising to 
reduce dependence on China.  Southeast Asia 
can attract a share of these relocations, but 
Indonesia is relatively unattractive to foreign 
investors due to its highly complex regulatory 
environment.  
• To simplify the regulatory landscape, the 
President proposes an Omnibus Bill, but its 
reach is limited. Moreover, it requires 400 new 
implementing regulations, which are supposed 
to be drafted within an ambitious one-month 
deadline, and it may lead to thousands other 
regulations. 
• Instead of rushing the reform, the President 
and his cabinet should focus on improving the 
quality of these implementing regulations by 
allowing 3-6 months for research and public 
consultations. 
• The President should also exert discipline 
on ministers by attaching simplification 
standards to budget allocations. A mapping of 
the regulatory framework should support the 
targeting and monitoring of reforms. 
• In the longer-term, it is necessary to revise 
Article 8 of Law 12/2011 on the establishment 
of laws and regulations, which bestows 
regulatory authority to a broad range of 
government agencies. The Law should also 
stipulate periodic regulatory reviews to 
abolish laws and regulations that have become 
irrelevant or inapplicable. 
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Silver Lining for Investment in Southeast Asia
Covid-19 pandemic began as a public health crisis but has now developed into one of the greatest challenges to 
international trade and investment.  The need to restrict interactions has gone against the interconnectedness 
which is the foundation of the Global Value Chains (GVC).  With international trade predicted to contract by 13 
– 32% in 2020 due to the pandemic, corporations simply have less cash available to invest in new ventures or 
to expand existing facilities.  Consequently, FDI is predicted to fall even deeper, reducing by as much as 40% 
depending on how long the outbreak lasts (UNCTAD, 2020; WTO, 2020).  
China’s economies of scale which were central to its role in the GVC have caused concerns even before the 
pandemic hit.  The US-China trade war forced many corporations to explore other locations to circumvent the 
escalation of tariffs.  As the pandemic reduces supplies from China, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are under 
increasing pressure to diversify their supply chain beyond China.  
UNCTAD and others have predicted that in order to improve their supply chain resilience, many MNEs will return 
facilities home in a move called “reshoring”.  Indeed, China’s major trade and investment partners are actively 
encouraging their corporations to return home.  Reported actions include the US mulling the possibility of 
government absorbing all reshoring costs, South Korea offering over US$3.6 billion of reshoring loans, and Japan 
allocating US$2 billion in its rescue package to help companies reshore (Jung, 2020; Landay, 2020; Reynolds & 
Urabe, 2020).  
Meanwhile, the trade war experience demonstrated that many MNEs prefer relocating their Chinese facilities to 
Southeast Asia (The World Bank, 2018). Reports have stated that Apple and Google have been exploring Vietnam 
and Thailand as alternative locations since mid-2019 and are now spurred on by the pandemic (Chatterjee, 2019; 
Cheng & Li, 2020a, 2020b).  Nearly one thousand Japanese manufacturers are diversifying procurement outside 
China, backed by their government which allocates over US$200 million for diversification into Southeast Asia 
(Reynolds & Urabe, 2020).  Amid the dark clouds rolling in on global investment, Southeast Asia economies may 
actually be the beneficiaries of an exodus from China.
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Indonesia Investment Challenges
As the largest economy in Southeast Asia, such GVC diversion should be welcome news for Indonesia.  However, 
Indonesia is relatively unattractive to foreign investors compared to its neighbours.  As Figure 1 shows, although 
its Ease of Doing Business rankings has improved significantly since 2014, this has been insufficient to catch up 
with most of its peers.  In fact, openness to FDI has been declining before reversing in 2015.  Both indicators show 
no improvement since 2017, which is rather unfortunate considering gains made by its neighbours in the same 
period (OECD, n.d.; Trading Economics, n.d.).
Figure 1. 
Ease of Doing Business and FDI Restrictiveness
Source: The World Bank via Trading Economics database, OECD


















EODB Rankings (out of 190)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018














Due to this restrictiveness, Indonesia was largely bypassed when 33 Chinese-listed companies were looking for 
other locations in 2019.  Prior to that in 2017, Indonesia only managed to attract 10 out of 137 Japanese companies 
moving into Southeast Asia (The World Bank, 2019).  Early signs of pandemic-led investment slowdown have been 
reported in Indonesia’s Special Economic Zones due to limited access to capital and physical distancing policies 
(Waseso, 2020).  Palu SEZ, for example, has had two Chinese manufacturers postponing their investment plans 
despite already carrying out some preparatory works there (ANTARA News, 2020).  Since SEZs offer investors 
special conditions and incentives, their problems to attract investments can be seen as a precursor to a general 
downturn of investment in Indonesia.  Serious efforts to increase Indonesia’s attractiveness for FDI are necessary 
to allow for a speedy economic recovery when Covid-19 subsides.
When highlighting the relocation cases, the World Bank (2019) asserted that a major deterrent for foreign 
investors here is the highly complex regulatory landscape.  It points to the sheer number of ministerial and 
regional regulations, and the many inconsistencies they cause.  Indeed, there are over 15 thousand ministerial 
regulations in Indonesia, 95% of which issued since 2010 (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, n.d.).  On top of 
that, each province, city and district (regency) can issue their own regulations as well (Figure 2).  If this “regulatory 
obesity” is not addressed thoroughly, Indonesia will continue to struggle attracting foreign investors.
To illustrate how burdensome this can be, when an investor wants to setup a factory in Indonesia to supply the 
domestic market, it will have to navigate over 900 rules of the Manpower and Industry Ministries.  If it plans to link 
up to the GVC and import intermediate goods or export final products, another 695 trade rules enter the picture. 
Added to this are sector-specific policies, issued by Ministers of Transportation, Education, Agriculture, Energy 
and Mineral Resources, Construction, ICT, and Tourism.  After escaping this central-regulation labyrinth, investors 
need to overcome the hurdle of hundreds of regional regulations, depending on where their investment is located.
Source: Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
Figure 2. 
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Signalling its commitment to simplify regulatory complexities, the President of Indonesia submitted a draft 
Omnibus Bill on Job Creation (the “Bill”) to the legislative assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR) in February 
2020. If passed, it revokes or revises over 1,200 articles in 79 laws deemed problematic for investors.  Drafted in 
approximately two months, it covers a broad swathe of policies from licensing to economic zones (Coordinating 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2020).  As a flagship reform effort, it sends a positive signal to the investment 
community. However, the Bill encounters staunch public opposition due to its perceived lack of transparency and 
rushed process.  This has led to obstacles in the legislative process and even possible rebranding when labour 
unions mobilized against it (Akhlas et al., 2020; Katadata, 2020a, 2020b).  
An analysis of the Bill’s content casts some doubt over its simplification effects.  Firstly, the Bill trims the highest 
level of regulation, i.e. the laws; but the obesity appears far below at the ministerial level. It revokes nearly 300 
articles in existing laws and revises over 900 more, but it also requires the drafting of over 400 new Government 
and Presidential Regulations.  This may seem like a good simplification exercise, but the real challenge lies in 
maintaining regulatory discipline at lower levels.
Article 8 of Law 12/2011 on establishing laws and regulations allows ministries and equivalent government 
agencies to issue legally binding regulations based on instructions by higher regulations or by their own authority. 
This latter part is understood as providing ministers and agencies with the authority to issue sector-specific 
regulations.  Such “proactive regulating” is the main contributor to regulatory obesity.  In investment, for example, 
Law 25/2007 foresees the implementation through 5 regulations1 but it is being cited by 39 ministerial and agency 
regulations.2 Without tight discipline, the 400 rules intended by the Omnibus Bill can easily become thousands; 
negating its simplification effort.
To complicate matters further, revoking an article in a law does not automatically void the pre-existing law and its 
implementing regulations.  In fact, the Bill’s article 173b expressly maintains validity of pre-existing regulations 
with an allowance of one month for “adjusting inconsistencies”. Investment Law, for example, the Bill revises 5 
out of 40 articles of this Law No. 25/2007. One article requires a new Presidential Regulation, while the other four 
require regulatory adjustments.  Meanwhile, the rest of Law No. 25/2007 remains valid and that would include 
its implementing regulations.  Hence, future investments will have to follow two laws, i.e. the new Omnibus Law 
and Law No. 25/2007, each with their own implementing regulations.  This increases complexity and the risk of 
overlap which can create further confusion.
Secondly, the Bill sets a very ambitious timeline for the regulatory follow-up process.  The one-month deadline 
includes not only the adjustment of existing implementing regulations (art. 173b) but also drafting new ones (art. 
173a).  Past research has highlighted the limited policy-making capacity in Indonesia which can take years to 
issue implementing regulations after a law is passed (Pramusinto, 2016).  As an example, Presidential Regulation 
on the use of Indonesian language has been issued ten years after the law was passed.3  Rushing revisions and 
400 new regulations in a month will impact their quality and end up creating further uncertainty in the investment 
landscape.  Hence, this whole simplification exercise can backfire and deter investors even more.
Lastly, there are regulations that pose unnecessary burdens to businesses but have not been covered by this 
reform.  A report by the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) points out that Indonesia needs 
to embark on a holistic regulatory reform to improve its global competitiveness (Sadiawati, 2015).  This report 
highlights regulatory reforms in South Korea after the 1997 crisis as a prime example: from 11,125 regulations 
identified, nearly half were revoked and over 20% were revised within 11 months.  In Indonesia, the government 
regulatory database (peraturan.go.id) records all regulations, their history, and linkages mainly for harmonisation 
purposes (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, n.d.).  However, these data are still presented in table format, 
which makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive review of all regulations in Indonesia.  It should be converted 
into a visual format, as done by Koniaris et al. (2017) to measure the complexity of EU regulations based on EUR-
Lex database (Figure 3).
Current Reforms 
1 These are three Presidential Regulations and two Investment Coordination Board Regulations
2 Including regulations from the Minister of Home Affairs, Agriculture, Trade, Industry, Energy and Mineral Resources, Transportation, Fisheries, 
Forestry, Social, and the Investment Coordination Board
3 Law 24/2009 on National Flag, Language, Emblem and Anthem was passed in July 2009 and stipulated a Presidential Regulation to be drafted for the 
language component.  Presidential Regulation 63/2019 on Indonesian Language Use was issued in September 2019.
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To truly improve ease of doing business and attract more investment, the Indonesian government should not 
consider the Bill as the only goal of reform, but as a breakthrough momentum that must be carried forward to 
usher more economic openness in the future. 
Source: Koniaris et al. (2017)
Figure 3. 
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• Extend the deadline for follow-up regulations in 
the Omnibus Bill 
 The President or the DPR should consider 
revising the one-month deadline for adjusting 
and issuing new regulations.  Considering public 
rejection on grounds of lack of transparency 
and rushed timeline, the Cabinet should ensure 
that each implementing regulation is backed by 
extensive research (Academic Script / Naskah 
Akademik) and intensive public consultations.  To 
allow for these, the deadline should be extended 
to 6 months or set a rolling deadlines of 3 months 
per cluster.  Priority should be given to clusters 
which impact sectors deemed important for 
economic recovery, such as agriculture and 
manufacturing.
• Exert tighter control over ministerial regulations 
 The President should adjust ministerial budget 
allocations to favour revoking or revising existing 
regulations over creating new ones.  This can be 
done by specifying a certain simplification ratio 
that is linked to budget drawdown. In the long 
run, the President should propose a revision to 
Law 12/2011, especially on Article 8, to limit 
proactive regulating by ministers.
• Conduct periodic review of regulations
 To address resources and capacity limitation, 
an ongoing review and simplification process 
needs to complement major reform efforts like 
the Omnibus Bill.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act 
of the United States can provide some guidance 
here (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2019).  It requires US federal 
agencies to specify a review milestone for every 
regulation issued, so that there is a constant flow 
of reviews coming up yearly.  Similar stipulations 
can be added to Law 12/2011 to ensure that all 
regulations are reviewed, perhaps a decade 
after issuance, to evaluate their relevance.
• Conduct periodic review of regulations
 To facilitate broad regulatory reforms and 
periodic reviews, a Legislation Network mapping 
can be useful.  As briefly mentioned above, 
this technique was introduced to measure the 
complexity of EU legislations (Koniaris et al., 
2017).  A similar mapping can be done based 
on the Indonesian government’s peraturan.go.id 
database.  A visual map of the whole regulatory 
framework exposes relationships between 
nodes that are not apparent in a table format. 
This tool should be used for reform targeting 
and monitoring.
The following recommendations seek to improve chances of attracting FDI to Indonesia:
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